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Many commentators acknowledge that the world is becoming a more uncertain place to live. 
Climate change, terrorism, food security, aging populations, systemic failures in financial 
systems, the list of significant realised and potential disruptions goes on. Increasingly we 
look to our governments to regulate, bail out, step-in or just generally save us. But what as a 
society are we doing to address the growing uncertainty that surrounds us? 
 
2010 represents the year peak labour occurs (more people will leave the workforce than join 
it). This means that for many of us, a focus on superannuation becomes quite acute. 
Approximately 59% of these retirement savings will be invested in equities, equities that 
must perform with a minimum of downward volatility to ensure a prosperous retirement. As a 
consequence now, more than ever before, society worries about the management approach 
of executives trusted with the responsibility of steering the large corporates that form the 
platform of our retirement prosperity. A perfectly justified but unintended consequence of this 
attention is the pursuit of short-term certainty.  
 
Retirees naturally want short-term certainty of returns from their superannuation funds or 
superfunds – they depend upon it. Fund managers, remunerated to provide these short-term 
returns, place pressure on executives to deliver them - after all, superfunds are probably 
their major shareholder and consequently do have a legitimate influence. The modern 
Australian executive therefore works hard to remove any volatility from their future short-
term performance. Whilst they need to remain competitive in their respective markets, and 
provide ongoing growth trajectories for their organisations, the actual nature of the 
competition is tempered to some extent in Australia, simply through size. A large proportion 
of Australian industries are oligopolies (four big banks, two main miners, two major 
supermarket chains, etc.). Whilst there are also large construction players, construction in 
Australia is one of the few industries where real competition still occurs. Having said this, 
oligopolistic characteristics still exist within different construction markets. Certainly at the 
big end of town, the pressures described above are still in effect for the ASX listed 
construction companies. 
 
An unintended outcome of an oligopolistic marketplace is that the focus of competition is on 
efficiency and effectiveness, not innovation. It is simply not worth the risk.  How often do we 
see an organisation out-perform analyst expectations when reporting its results, with no 
impact on the share price? The market response is that the higher performance had already 
been factored into the share price, and whilst the performance is good, we already expected 
it to be good. Yet when an organisation underperforms to expectations, for example 5 per 
cent below projected growth, the market response is swift, and the stock may well have 
more than 15 per cent of its value wiped away, an arguably illogical response. Let us 
consider the effect of this type of dynamic for a minute. If you’re a CEO, concerned with the 
future growth of your organisation, what is the reward for taking risk on more uncertain but 
potentially higher returning activities? If taking the risk pays off in terms of out-performance, 
the reward for doing so, under the short-term focus described above, is nothing. The 
punishment, should this risk produce a small negative volatility to performance (in the short-
term) is out of all proportion. Let’s also not forget that a high percentage of the CEO’s 
remuneration package will be geared to short-term performance. So the probability is that 
you just don’t take any risks where there is some uncertainty involved. You focus on 
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activities around which you have the most certainty – those focused on efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
 
Let me follow this logic a bit further. Many organisations pursue a policy of hiring for and 
promoting the best and brightest staff they can get their hands on. This is only logical.  But 
what does ‘best and brightest’ mean in this scenario. It means those that are the best and 
brightest in providing efficiency and effectiveness in the organisation’s operations, i.e. 
providing certainty on performance. So by default, the talent pool at the top of our major 
corporates begins to take on a particular worldview and approach to management. 
Furthermore organisations demand more of this style of employee, or at the very least the 
ability to develop them. Enter the Master of Business Administration (MBA), the key 
efficiency and effectiveness qualification for the modern executive. Whilst many MBAs are 
designed to high standards and the quality of the people who deliver them is also very high, 
the MBA is a response to a market need. Often built around the use of best practice studies 
all designed to provide knowledge on how to achieve increased certainty of outcome. 
 
The result of all this is that we have a market environment unconsciously obsessed with 
short-term certainty, giving rise to an unintended preponderance of short-term focused 
executives, selected for their highly developed ability to deliver certainty around 
performance, taught by and demanding more educational qualifications that help them be 
better deliverers of certainty to all their stakeholders, including retirees whose superfunds 
are invested in the companies they manage. So what’s wrong with a highly developed ability 
to deliver certainty? Put simply, nothing – so long as you are in a stable environment. 
 
Thinking about Uncertainty 
Professor James March (1991) conceptualised the way in which organisations adapt and 
learn as a tension between processes of exploitation and exploration. Exploitation processes 
develop to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in an organisation’s operations. They are 
focused on the delivery of quality, cost management and control, through hierarchical silo-
based structures that remove volatility. Change initiatives are large and deliberate. The 
focus is short-term and on the reduction of risk by breaking problems down into small 
manageable pieces. Put another way ‘exploit’ processes are designed for the management 
of certainties. Conversely processes of exploration involve potentially ad hoc changes in 
direction. The focus is more opportunistic, and long-term, structures are smaller and 
collaborative. The risk appetite is higher and as a consequence it is usually through these 
exploration processes that innovation occurs. ‘Explore’ processes assume an uncertain 
environment and as a consequence are designed for the holistic management of 
uncertainties. Young or start-up organisations are characterised by a greater degree of 
‘explore’, due to the uncertainty involved in bringing a new product/service to market. Over 
the lifetime of an organisation, the balance gradually shifts from ‘explore’ to ‘exploit’ in 
response to the growing size of the organisation, the need to manage increased complexity, 
and the desire to remove uncertainty across the different aspects of its operations1. 
 
Viewed through the lens of ‘explore’ and ‘exploit’, today’s modern Australian corporate is 
geared to be almost totally ‘exploit’ – it has to be. This is the best way to respond to the 
needs of the organisation’s various stakeholders as described above. This imbalance 
creates a worldview in the organisation, that I would argue kills off the organisation’s ability 
to innovate and deal with uncertainty. This occurs in a number of ways, but most obviously 
where it relates to the introduction of what might be termed strategic innovations, i.e. 
innovations that are potentially disruptive to incumbent business models and require a few 
years of incubation. 
                                               
1
 An exception to this can often be found in ostensibly family owned businesses, or businesses where the 
founder is still in control rather than employed  professional managers. 
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This type of innovation usually falls outside the short-term business planning cycle, and 
therefore the objectives of professional managers. It is inherently uncertain, and so from the 
executive’s point of view a threat to the delivery of short-term certainty – not an opportunity.  
Furthermore because the organisation is overwhelmingly exploit all investments in new 
opportunities need to be assessed through the ‘Exploit’ business planning and budget cycle.  
The result of this is that speculative ‘explore’ ideas are directly evaluated against ‘exploit’ 
ideas, i.e. cost cutting projects, IT refresh etc. In other words the uncertain ‘Explore’ project 
is measured and assessed against the high certainty ‘Exploit’ project in direct competition for 
typically finite funds. It is not surprising that the ‘Exploit’ project always wins. The risk/reward 
equation in the modern Corporate cannot lead to any other result. 
 
Historically a circuit breaker for this problem was the discretionary budgets often allocated to 
senior executives, within which more speculative activities could be undertaken, without 
coming under the spotlight of the ‘exploit’ budget process. Indeed many senior executives 
used these funds for ‘explore’ purposes (often in the form of skunk-works projects). Over the 
past 15 years or so, (a period roughly equivalent to the introduction of compulsory 
superannuation and the socio-economic dynamic associated with it), these funds have been 
gradually whittled away through successive rounds of cost-cutting and downsizing to the 
point where only extremely incremental innovation can really be considered out of these 
pools. 
 
In other words, in many Australian corporates, for an innovation to be successfully 
introduced it needs to be able to display an adequate level of certainty compared to other 
budget items, so that when it is considered for approval, the risk of not doing it is greater 
than the risk of doing it. Note that the opportunity associated with the innovation is usually 
removed from the deliberation, as this is uncertain. 
 
It also means that organisations by default develop and apply tools that assume certainty in 
relation to new opportunities, rather than systematically reduce uncertainty. The use of best 
practice studies is an example of this approach. An idea that is new to an organisation can 
be presented as having higher levels of certainty because someone else has already done 
it. From an ‘exploit’ point of view this is great and assists the idea move through the 
budgetary process. From an ‘explore’ point of view however, this is fairly problematic.  
Firstly, for something to be the subject of a best practice study it would need to be at least 
five years old, so nothing particularly innovative there. Secondly, in introducing the idea, the 
actual uncertainty in relation to how this idea might behave in the new Australian context 
hasn’t been ‘explored’, ironically increasing the risk. 
 
As a consequence, we still have a significant proportion of projects that are described as 
being innovative, (even after the best practice study) that fail to deliver because the 
expected certainty of the result observed in the idea’s original context couldn’t be replicated. 
This provides a further reason for executives to avoid innovation if they can. 
 
The other option for the organisation to gain new capability or market penetration is to merge 
or acquire another business. Again on one level this provides a feeling of certainty as many 
of the characteristics of the acquired entity can be measured. Unfortunately, like the best 
practice study, the complexity of implementing the merger often brings the organisation 
undone. A variety of studies conducted by both academics and through the large chartered 
firms show that between 50 and 80per cent of mergers fail to deliver on their projected 
benefits. The reason for this failure is usually attributed to soft issues such as culture, where 
the ‘exploit’ measures tend not to be effective. 
 
The development of highly sophisticated ‘explore’ capacities (or capacities that are at least 
as competent as their ‘exploit’ counterparts) is something that is sadly lacking in Australian 
corporates. Furthermore it is a situation that is likely to get worse rather than better due to 
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the socio-economic dynamics described in the first section of this discussion. This is 
something we should all be concerned about given the growing levels of uncertainty in our 
environment. Our ability to ‘Exploit’ has served us well and will continue to do so under the 
right circumstances. Without an ‘Explore’ capacity though one has to wonder how well we 
are prepared to deal with a changing future, or respond to an unforeseen one. 
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